

THE CAPITAL.

IMPORTANT PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.

VETO MESSAGE.

The Civil Rights Bill Returned to Congress.

The President's Objections to the Bill.

It is Unconstitutional, Anomalous and Unnecessary.

It Creates a Distinction of Color in Favor of the Black Man and Tends to Resuscitate Rebellion.

No Vote Taken by the Senate on the Message.

The Radicals Sanguine of Passing the Bill Over the Veto.

A VOTE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN TO-DAY.

Senator Stockton's Case Disposed of.

He is Declared Excluded from a Seat in the Senate.

Ineffectual Attempt to Reconsider the Vote.

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1866.

VETO OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL.—THE CASE OF SENATOR STOCKTON.

This has been one of the most exciting days yet experienced during the present session of the Senate. The interest manifested in the Stockton case and the anticipation of the President's veto of the Civil Rights bill, attracted a crowded attendance, not only in the galleries, but also on the floor. As early as half past eleven o'clock fully one-half of the seats in the galleries were already filled, and by the time the Senate was called to order there was little room left for the large numbers continuing to arrive. By one o'clock several of the doors in the galleries were closed and the admission of visitors shut off.

During the morning hour a bill was introduced by Senator Doolittle, which, it is said, covers the whole ground taken by the President on the important questions now agitating the country. Senator Stewart also brought in a bill as a substitute to the one he introduced some days ago.

At one o'clock the Stockton case came up, and a great effort was made by the gentlemen's friends to effect a postponement. During this controversy, at a quarter past one, a message from the President of the United States was announced. This information prompted a general leaning forward in the galleries, and a sudden silence pervaded the whole chamber. Every eye listened with the utmost eagerness to catch the words of the bearer of the message. Colonel McKim, President Secretary to Mr. Johnson, in a loud voice, announced to the Senate that the President of the United States returned the bill protecting citizens in their civil rights with his objections thereto in writing, though there was apparently an ardent curiosity to hear the objections. The curious, however, were doomed to a serious delay. No sooner was the message received by the speaker than the conflict on the postponement of the Stockton case was resumed, and when pushed to a vote was lost. Mr. Stockton himself now took the floor and consumed two hours and a half in reading his argument in vindication of his claims to his seat.

During this speech the arrival of the veto came to the ears of the members of the House of Representatives and attracted a large attendance upon the floor of the Senate. After waiting about an hour a member came in, privately announcing some unexpected operations in the other end of the building, where a general stampede of members took place to look after their own interests. When Mr. Stockton took his seat a cross-fire of amendments and motions to postpone came up and were fiercely contested, resulting in the passage of the amendment excluding Mr. Stockton, owing to the dodging of Mr. Stewart. It was now five o'clock, and still further efforts were made to renew the discussion, but without avail. Several members here moved to adjourn, but the will of the Senate was to the contrary.

The reading of the President's objections to the Civil Rights bill was now in order, and the message was listened to with evident interest. After the conclusion of the reading the radicals were for pushing a vote on the question of passing the bill over the veto, and for a time affairs looked stormy, but the elements of opposition were soon dissipated when it was understood that Senators Grimes and Kirkwood, overcome by the irresistible attacks of the inner man, had gone out to dinner. The further consideration of the question was therefore postponed until to-morrow.

After the adjournment of the House of Representatives a large number of members again gathered in the Senate. Among these were Messrs. Washburne, Thad. Stevens, Roscoe Conkling, Stilwell, Bingham and Eggleston. General "Baldy" Smith and Grierson, Hon. I. D. Campbell, Mr. Romero, Mexican Minister, Colonel Russell, Danish Minister, Sir Frederick Bruce, English Minister, Freeman Clark, Judge Maynor of the United States Supreme Court, and Major Morrow were also present.

The radicals are exceedingly sanguine of being able to pass the Civil Rights bill over the veto. They claim that they could have accomplished that result to-night if Senators Grimes and Kirkwood had not left the Senate. They absented themselves was the cause of the adjournment. They claim to have made converts of both Senator Stewart and Senator Wiley of West Virginia. If, however, it is found to-morrow that they have not votes enough to override the veto, the question will be postponed until New Jersey elects a Senator and Vermont also sends one in the place of Foot, who can hardly live to-night out. It is also claimed that Colorado will be admitted on a pledge of the Senators to go against the President. Thus it will be seen that they are determined not to miss this time, but to make the breach between them and the President complete. There is little doubt but that they will be able to carry their point, especially in the shape of both Dixon and Wright from

sickness. Stewart is sure to vote with the radicals; but Wiley is claimed by both sides, as is also Lane, of Kansas. The chances are, exceedingly thin, for sustaining the veto in the Senate. Senators Wilson and Trumbull are sanguine of success. The former declares that hereafter a two-thirds vote in the Senate is sure against the President on all questions. He openly asserts that they will make a record against the President now, and that they will finally reach a point that he has claimed for the last six months they must come to. The friends of the President seem to apprehend no fears of the result of the vote, but they evidently do not understand the work that has been done by the radicals to win over those republicans who voted to sustain the former veto. While they have been active the President has retained their allies in his Cabinet and other offices, and has done nothing to strengthen the hands of those who stood by him on the Freedmen's Bureau veto. This has disheartened some of his former supporters and given the radicals the very weapons which have enabled them to influence the votes of some of the wavering Senators. This shows the folly of retaining opponents to his policy in his Cabinet. It is reported that four members of the Cabinet are against the veto—Secretaries Denison, Stanton, Harlan and Speed—and that Seward, McCullough and Welles approve it.

Senator Sumner was rushing around the city excitedly this evening, and made himself well known ubiquitous. Within an hour or so he was at Senator Morgan's, the uptown hotels and the National Hotel, besides being passed and repassed several times on Pennsylvania avenue. To avoid the White House appeared to be his first desire, and rapid locomotion the second. Canvassing for to-morrow's vote was the reason generally assigned for his unwonted haste.

CONDITION OF SENATOR FOOT.—At eleven o'clock to-night Senator Foot was still living, but not expected to survive the night. Should he die before noon to-morrow no vote will be had upon the President's veto message for two or three days, and possibly not for a week.

THE TAX ON WOOL.—R. M. Montgomery, President of the Ohio Wool Growers' Association; Henry S. Randall, President of the National Wool Growers' Association, and Edwin Hammond, the merino king of Vermont, are in Washington, having been summoned to appear before the Committee on Ways and Means to give their views in the matters of tax and tariff on wool.

THE BANKRUPT BILL IN THE HOUSE.—The greater part of the day was spent in the House in discussion of the Bankrupt bill, reported some time ago by Mr. Jencks, of Rhode Island, from the Select Committee on the Judiciary. The absorbing interest of the proceedings in the Senate wing of the Capitol left barely a quorum in the House, with a very sparse collection of admirers in the galleries. Mr. Jencks struggling along with his bill, defeating two or three motions to adjourn, till about four o'clock, when he succeeded in getting the previous question ordered, so the vote will come to-morrow. The bill has been picked to pieces so that Mr. Jencks himself hardly recognized it, and there is very little probability that it will pass.

POSTPONEMENT OF THE MASS MEETING OF NATIONAL UNIONISTS.—The mass meeting of National Unionists, called for to-morrow evening in this city, has been postponed until next week.

NAVY YARD AT LEAGUE ISLAND.—The House Naval Committee has decided to report in favor of League Island, at Philadelphia, as a site for the new navy yard for iron clads.

DECISION OF COMMISSIONER ROLLINS.—The following interesting decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has just been made public:—

OFFICE OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WASHINGTON, March 23, 1866.

Sum-Yuan of the 19th inst. is received. You inquire if the fixed salary of an assistant collector is subject to the charge of real estate in a proper deduction from the rents and profits thereof, and exempt from income tax. I reply that the fixed salary of an assistant collector is not subject to the charge of real estate in a proper deduction from the rents and profits thereof, and exempt from income tax. I reply that the fixed salary of an assistant collector is not subject to the charge of real estate in a proper deduction from the rents and profits thereof, and exempt from income tax.

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grove, two from the District of Columbia and ten to be selected yearly from the sons of officers or men who have been in the naval, military or marine service. They must be examined, and be between fourteen and seventeen years of age. The President is empowered to designate the two in the District of Columbia and the ten at large. The others are selected by members of Congress. The selections before March 1, 1866, shall be made from boys who have served one year, and after that date from boys who have served two years as naval apprentices, and each number must select not less than three boys yearly, and each Senator not less than two, to be enlisted as such apprentices. Before examination the boys shall be styled naval cadets, afterwards midshipmen. Naval cadets deficient in education shall not be continued at examination, nor reappointed the same year. The appointments for 1866 are to be made according to the laws in force.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.—Mr. DOOLITTLE introduced a bill to provide appropriate legislation to enforce article thirteen of the amendments of the constitution abolishing slavery in the States, which was referred to the Committee on Judiciary. The bill will be found in full in the Herald Supplement sheet.—ED. HERALD.

SUBSTITUTE FOR MR. STEWART'S JOINT RESOLUTION IN RELATION TO RECONSTRUCTION.—Mr. STEWART, (rep.) of Nevada, submitted a substitute for his recent joint resolution, which provides that no discrimination in civil rights shall exist among the population of the United States (Indians not taxed excepted) on account of race or color or previous condition of servitude. But in case of extraordinary conditions in the States this provision shall not work disfranchisement of any persons now entitled to vote; that obligations and liabilities incurred while the insurrection and rebellion, and claims for compensation on account of emancipation of slaves are not valid and shall not be assumed or paid by any State or the United States; that whenever any of the States whose inhabitants were lately in insurrection, through its Legislature, having been first authorized to do so by a majority of its present voting members, shall enact laws whereby it shall be qualified to vote under the laws thereof as they existed in 1860, shall have ratified the foregoing amendment of the constitution, and shall have complied with the laws in conformity therewith, then and in that case such State shall be recognized, and its representatives admitted into Congress; and a general amnesty shall be granted to all persons in such State who were in any way connected with armed opposition to the United States government, relieving them of all pains, penalties and disabilities now or hereafter to be imposed by reason of their connection.

The last resolution declares that it is not intended to amend a corrective act of Congress to regulate the rights of suffrage in the States.

THE CASE OF SENATOR STOCKTON.—The case of Mr. Stockton was then taken up. The question was upon postponement further consideration until Thursday next.

Mr. STOCKTON, (dem.) of N. J., desired to make an explanation. He stated that the present President of the New Jersey Senate was elected by his own vote. This was a mistake; he was elected by changing his vote, and the Senate was not in session when he voted for the President. He would also state that he had received a despatch from his colleague stating that he hoped the case would be postponed until Thursday, as Mr. Wright would be here then or on Friday.

Mr. HENDRICKS, (rep.) of Ind., appealed to the Senate to postpone the subject to Thursday, as Mr. Wright would be here then or on Friday.

Mr. CLARK, (rep.) of N. H., was opposed to the postponement. There was no reason why Mr. Wright could not have been here to-day as well as on Thursday.

Mr. JOHNSON, (dem.) of Md., said Mr. Wright's physical condition was such that he would not be able to appear in person. He was expected to come late to-night, but that he could come on Wednesday night.

Mr. FORTSON, (rep.) of Va., was surprised to hear from a neighbor of his that Mr. Wright not only did not expect to be here on Thursday, but never expected to be here.

Mr. HENDRICKS again appealed for a postponement. He was interrupted in his remarks by the arrival of the President's Private Secretary, at one P. M., who came to announce the return, with the President's objections, of the Civil Rights bill.

Mr. CORWELL, (rep.) of Cal., spoke against the postponement. Mr. STOCKTON said there was no assurance that there would be a fuller Senate on Thursday. Disease had made a pair between the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Foot) and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Wright). Let that suffice, and let this important question be decided at once.

Mr. SARGENT, (dem.) of Del., said he did not know of any objection to his holding his seat, so that (unless a change had occurred lately in his opinions) disease had made no pair in that case, and the Senator from Massachusetts was not to be considered.

Mr. HENDRICKS said that Mr. Stockton would not vote on questions brought before the Senate until Thursday, and that he would not vote on the question of the amendment of the Constitution until Thursday.

Mr. CORWELL said this suggestion was entirely gratuitous on the part of Mr. Hendricks. It implied that Mr. Stockton was a coward, and that he was afraid to vote on the question of the amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. DAVIS, (dem.) of Ky., spoke in favor of the postponement, after which Mr. CLARK moved to decide the negative, yeas 18, nays 23, as follows:—

YEAS.—Messrs. Anthony, Buchanan, Cowan, Davis, Guthrie, Harris, Hendricks, Johnson, McKim, Morgan, Morrill, Sherman, Sumner, Tilden, Wilson and Yates—23.

NAYS.—Messrs. Adams, Chandler, Clark, Conness, Cragg, Fremont, Fessenden, Grimes, Howard, Hayes, Kirkwood, Lane, Leach, Lincoln, McKim, Morgan, Morrill, Sherman, Sumner, Tilden, Wilson and Yates—18.

The Senate decided that Mr. Stockton would not vote on questions brought before the Senate until Thursday, and that he would not vote on the question of the amendment of the Constitution until Thursday.

Mr. CLARK moved to amend the resolution so as to make it read:—

Resolved, That John P. Stockton, not having received a majority of the votes of the Legislature of the State of New Jersey for President and voting, is not entitled to his seat as Senator from that State for the term of six years from the 4th of March, 1866.

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THE VETO.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.—I request that the bill, which has passed both houses of Congress, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights and furnish the means of their vindication," their rights and furnish the means of their vindication, which I cannot approve consistently with my sense of duty to the whole people and my obligations to the constitution of the United States, I am, therefore, constrained to return it to the Senate (the House in which it originated) with my objections to its becoming a law.

By the first section of the bill all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color, negroes, mulattoes and persons of African blood. Every individual of these races born in the United States is by the bill made a citizen of the United States. It does not propose to declare or confer any other right of citizenship than federal citizenship; it does not propose to give these classes of persons any status as citizens of States, except that which may result from their status as citizens of the United States. The power to confer the right of State citizenship is just as exclusively with the several States as the power to confer the right of federal citizenship is with Congress. The right of federal citizenship thus to be conferred in the several States excepted before mentioned is now for the first time proposed to be given by law. If, as is claimed by many, all persons who are native born already are, by virtue of the constitution, citizens of the United States—the passage of the pending bill cannot be necessary to make them such. If, on the other hand, such persons are not citizens, as may be assumed from the proposed legislation to make them such, the grave question presents itself, whether, where eleven of the thirty-six States are unrepresented in Congress at the time, it is sound policy to make our entire colored population and all other excepted classes citizens of the United States. Four million of them have just merged from slavery into freedom. Can it be reasonably supposed that they possess the requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship of the United States? Have the people of the several States expressed such a conviction? It may also be asked whether it is necessary that they should be declared citizens in order that they may be secured in the enjoyment of the civil rights proposed to be conferred by the bill? Those rights are, by federal as well as by State laws, secured to all domiciled aliens and foreigners, even before the completion of the process of naturalization; and it may safely be assumed that the same enactments are sufficient to give like protection and benefits to those for whom this bill provides special legislation. Besides, the policy of the government, from its origin to the present time, seems to have been that persons who are strangers to, and unfamiliar with, our institutions and our laws should pass through a certain probation, at the end of which, before attaining the coveted prize, they must give evidence of their fitness to receive and to exercise the rights of citizens as contemplated by the constitution of the United States. The bill in effect proposes a discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy and patriotic foreigners, and in favor of the negro, to whom after long years of bondage the avenues to freedom and intelligence have just now been suddenly opened. He must of necessity, from his previous unfortunate condition of servitude, be less informed as to the nature and character of our institutions than he who comes from abroad, and, to some extent, at least, feel his way to the principles of our government to which he voluntarily entrusts life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Yet it is now proposed, by a single legislative enactment, to confer the rights of citizenship upon all persons of African descent, born within the extended limits of the United States, while persons of foreign birth, who make our land their home, must undergo a probation of five years, and can only then become citizens upon proof that they are of good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.

The first section of the bill also contains an enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes so enumerated in every State and Territory in the United States. These rights are to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties and give evidence in court, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as are enjoyed by white citizens; and, too, they are made subject to the same punishment, pains and penalties, in common with white citizens, and to more others. Thus, a perfect equality of the white and colored races is attempted to be fixed by federal law in every State of this Union, over the vast field of State jurisdiction covering these enumerated rights. In no case of them can any State exercise any power of discrimination between different races. In the exercise of State police over matters exclusively affecting the people of each State, it has frequently been thought expedient to discriminate between the two races. By the statutes of some of the States, the State of North Carolina, for instance, it is enacted, for instance, that no white person shall intermarry with a negro or mulatto. Chancellor Kent says, speaking of the blacks, that marriages between them and the whites are forbidden in some of the States where slavery does not exist, and they are prohibited in all the slaveholding States by law, and where not absolutely contrary to law they are reprobated and regarded as an offense against public decorum.

I do not say that this bill repeals State laws on the subject of marriage between the two races; for, as the whites are forbidden to intermarry with the blacks, the blacks can only make such contracts as the whites themselves are allowed to make, and, therefore, cannot under this bill enter into the marriage contract with the whites. I cite this discrimination, however, as an instance of the State policy as to discrimination, and to inquire whether, if Congress can abrogate all State laws of discrimination between the two races, in the matter of real estate, of civil, and of criminal law, it is not inconsistent with the constitution to make laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races. If it is not inconsistent with the constitution to make laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races, it is not inconsistent with the constitution to make laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races. If it is not inconsistent with the constitution to make laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races, it is not inconsistent with the constitution to make laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races.

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tant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. This section seems to be designed to apply to some existing or future law of a State or Territory which may conflict with the provisions of the bill now under consideration. It provides for punishing any person who may pass such conflicting laws, or upon the officers or agents who shall put, or attempt to put, them into execution. It means an official offense, not a common crime committed against law upon the person or property of the black race. Such an act may deprive the black man of his property, but not of his right to hold property. It means a deprivation of the right either by the State Judiciary or by the State Legislature. It is therefore assumed that under this section members of a State Legislature who should vote for laws conflicting with the provisions of the bill that judges of the State courts who should render judgments in antagonism with its terms, and that marshals and sheriffs who should, as ministerial officers, execute processes sanctioned by State laws and issued by State judges in execution of their judgments, could be brought before other tribunals, and there subjected to fine and imprisonment for the performance of the duties which such State laws might impose. The legislation thus proposed invades the judicial power of the State. It says to every State judge or judge—if you decide that this act is unconstitutional; if you refuse under this prohibition of a State law to allow a negro to testify; if you hold that over such a subject matter the said law is paramount, and under color of a State law refuse the exercise of the right to the negro, your error of judgment, however conscientious, shall subject you to fine and imprisonment. I do not apprehend that the conflicting legislation which this bill seems to contemplate is so likely to occur as to render it necessary at this time to adopt a measure of such doubtful constitutionality. In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary, as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted to secure the desired end without invading the immunities of legislators, always important to be preserved in the interest of public liberty, without assailing the independence of the judiciary, always essential to the preservation of individual rights and without impairing the efficiency of ministerial officers, always necessary for the maintenance of public peace and order. The remedy proposed by this section seems to be in this respect not only anomalous but unconstitutional; for the constitution guarantees nothing with certainty if it does not insure to the several States the right of making inferior laws in regard to all matters arising within their jurisdiction, subject only to the restriction, in cases of conflict with the constitution and constitutional laws of the United States, the latter to be held as the supreme law of the land. The third section gives the district courts of the United States exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of this act, and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the United States of all civil and criminal cases affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts, or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section. The construction which I have given to the second section is strengthened by this third section; for it makes clear what kind of denial or deprivation of rights secured by the first section was in contemplation. It is a denial or deprivation of such rights in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State. It stands therefore clear of doubt, that the offense and the punishment provided in the second section are intended for the State judge, who, in the exercise of his functions as a judge, not acting ministerially, but judicially, shall decide contrary to this federal law. In other words, when a State judge, acting upon a question involving a conflict between a State law and federal law, and bound, according to his own judgment and responsibility, to give an impartial decision between the two, comes to the conclusion that the State law is valid and the federal law is invalid, he must not follow the dictates of his own judgment at the peril of fine and imprisonment. The legislative department of the government of the United States thus takes from the judicial department of the States the sacred and exclusive duty of judicial decision, and converts the State judge into a mere ministerial officer, bound to give according to the will of Congress. It is clear that in States which deny to persons whose rights are secured by the first section of the bill any of their rights, all civil and criminal cases affecting them will, by the provisions of the third section, come under the executive cognizance of the federal tribunals. It follows that, if in any State which denies to a colored person any one of all those rights, that person should commit a crime against the laws of a State—murder, arson, rape, or any other crime—absolute and punishment through the courts of the State are taken away, and he can only be tried and punished in the federal courts. Now is the criminal to be tried if the offense is provided for and punished by federal law? That law, and not the State law, is to govern. It is only when the offense does not happen to be within the purview of federal law that the federal courts are to try and punish him and not the State courts. Then resort is to be had to the State law, as modified and changed by the federal law, in so far as the same is not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. So that over this vast domain of criminal jurisprudence, provided by each State for the protection of its own citizens and for the punishment of all persons who violate its criminal laws, federal law, wherever it can be made to apply, displaces State law. The question here naturally arises from what source Congress derives its power to transfer to federal tribunals certain classes of cases embraced in this section. The constitution expressly declares that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two States, between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming land under grants of more States, between a State and citizens of another State, and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects." Here the judicial power of the United States is expressly set forth and defined; and the act of September 24, 1789, establishing the judicial courts of the United States, in conferring upon the federal courts jurisdiction over cases originating in State tribunals, is careful to confine them to the classes enumerated in the above recited clause of the constitution. This section of the bill undoubtedly comprehends cases and authorities the exercise of powers that are not, by the constitution, within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. To transfer them to those courts would be an exercise of authority well calculated to excite distrust and alarm on the part of all the States; for the bill applies alike to all of them, as well to those that have as to those that have not been engaged in rebellion.

It may be assumed that this authority is limited to the power granted to Congress by the constitution, as recently amended, to enforce by appropriate legislation the article declaring that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. It cannot, however, be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of this article of the constitution, there is at present any anxiety for the exercise of all the powers which this bill confers. Slavery has been abolished, and at present nowhere exists, within the jurisdiction of the United States, nor has there been, nor is it likely there will be, any attempt to re-assert it by the people of any State. If, however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the duty of the general government to exercise any and all constitutional powers necessary and proper to maintain and enforce this great law of freedom. The fourth section of the bill provides that should

any of the President's Bureau shall be empowered to make arrests, and also that other officers may be specially commissioned for that purpose by the President of the United States. It also authorizes Circuit Courts of the United States and the Superior Courts of the territories to appoint, without limitation, commissioners who are to be charged with the performance of quasi judicial duties. The fifth section empowers the commissioners so to be selected by the court to appoint in writing one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute warrants and other process lawfully by the bill. Numerous official agents are made to constitute a set of police, in addition to the military, and are authorized to summon a peace constable, and even to call to their aid such portion of the land and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, "as may be necessary to the performance of the duty with which they are charged." This extraordinary power is to be conferred upon agents irresponsible to the government and to the people, to whose number the discretion of the commissioners is the only limit, and in whose hands such authority might be made a terrible engine of wrong, oppression and fraud. The general statutes regulating the land and naval forces of the United States, the militia and the execution of the laws, are believed to be adequate for any emergency which can occur in time of peace. It is therefore proper otherwise Congress can at any time amend these laws in such manner as, while preserving the public welfare, not to jeopardize the rights, interests and liberties of the people.

The seventh section provides that a fee of ten dollars shall be paid to each commissioner in every case brought before him, and a fee of five dollars to his deputy or deputies for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such commissioner, with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable by such commissioner in general for performing such other duties as may be required in the premises. All these fees are to be paid out of the Treasury of the United States, whether there is a conviction or not; but in case of conviction they are to be recoverable from the defendant. It seems to me that under the influence of such temptations bad men might convert any law, however benevolent, into an instrument of persecution and fraud. By the sixth section of the bill the United States courts, which sit only in one place for white citizens, must inaugurate with the marshal and district attorney, and necessarily with the sheriff, although he is not mentioned as a part of the district court for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and trial of persons charged with a violation of this act, and there the judge and officers of the court must remain upon the order of the President for the time therein designated.

The ninth section authorizes the President, or such person as he may empower for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act. This language seems to imply a permanent military force that is to be always at hand, and whose only business it is to be the enforcement of this measure over the vast region where it is intended to operate.

I do not propose to consider the policy of this bill. The bill is the result of the passions of the hour. The white race and black race of the South have hitherto lived together under the relation of master and slave—capital owning labor. Now that relation is changed, and as to ownership capital and labor are divorced. They stand now, each master of itself. In this new relation, one being necessary to the other, there will be a new adjustment, which both are deeply interested in making harmonious. Each has equal power in settling the terms